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Abstract
Information is a critical dimension in warfare. Inaccurate information such as
misinformation or disinformation further complicates military operations. In this
paper, we examine the value of misinformation and disinformation to a military
leader who through investment in people, programs and technology is able to affect
the accuracy of information communicated between other actors. We model the
problem as a partially observable stochastic game with three agents, a leader and two
followers. We determine the value to the leader of misinformation or disinformation
being communicated between two (i) adversarial followers and (ii) allied followers.
We demonstrate that only under certain conditions, the prevalent intuition that the
leader would benefit from less (more) accurate communication between adversarial
(allied) followers is valid. We analyzed why the intuition may fail and show a
holistic paradigm taking into account both the reward structures and policies of
agents is necessary in order to correctly determine the value of misinformation and
disinformation. Our research identifies efficient targeted investments to affect the
accuracy of information communicated between followers to the leader’s advantage.
Keywords: misinformation, disinformation, communication, partially observable Markov
decision process, partially observable stochastic game
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1 Introduction
Both state and non-state actors seek to advance their objectives by leveraging the in-
formation environment (IE) defined as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and
systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information” (Joint Publication
1-02). The recent Battle of Mosul (2016-2017) is representative. As reported in The
Wall Street Journal, the battle involved just a few thousand untrained militants arrayed
against a much larger formally trained force (Spencer 2017). Over the course of more
than two years prior to the battle, the militants constructed elaborate defenses includ-
ing an extensive tunnel system. During the nine months long conflict afterwards, the
militants used social media to communicate amongst themselves the exact location and
direction of opposing forces, which enabled the militants to move mobile defense assets
(everything from snipers to exploding vehicles) to specified locations at specified times
to achieve their desired objectives (e.g., mortality of opposing forces). While information
sharing via social media aided the efforts of the militants, communication problems on
the other hand hindered the opposing forces. One particular problem arose in providing
fire support to units advancing against militant positions. Units providing fire support
needed information about the “forward line of troops” to prevent friendly force casual-
ties, however communicating accurate information between units in the battlefield was
very challenging for a variety of reasons including a changing electromagnetic spectrum
(Mosul Study Group 2017).
The above illustrates the centrality of the IE militarily. Not surprisingly, leading state
actors have long seen dominating the IE as crucial to the success of their efforts in war-
fare (Department of the Army 1996). Dominance of the IE involves (i) preserving one’s
own capabilities and those of allies, and (ii) affecting the capabilities of rivals (Ardis
and Keene 2018). Historically, dominating the IE in open war has to a large degree
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been about destroying the command, control and communication (C3) infrastructure of
an adversary. However, destruction of C3 infrastructure has become more difficult with
the rise of the internet, advances in information technology, widespread availability of
wireless communication, and the ubiquity of social media (Department of Defense 2016).
Moreover, with advanced technology now more widely available and less costly than it
was before, states with limited resources and non-state actors, both previously relegated
to the sidelines, have emerged as rivals to traditional powers in the IE. The result of these
trends is that the IE is now a much more competitive space than it was previously and
establishing dominance of the IE is becoming more difficult. Nonetheless, many actors
continue to attempt to shape the IE to their advantage, where shaping entails making
investments in people, programs and technology that preserve/improve friendly mission-
essential information and affect rival mission-essential information (JCOIE 2018).
In this paper, we determine the value to an actor (e.g., a military force; referred to as
the leader in the rest of the paper) of shaping the IE through investment. Specifically,
we analyze the value to the leader of modulating information flows between other actors
(referred to as followers). We examine two types of scenarios: (i) a non-collaborative
scenario, where followers are adversaries of the leader (e.g., groups of militants in the
Battle of Mosul; the leader is the opposing military force), and (ii) a collaborative sce-
nario, where followers are allies of the leader (e.g., units of the military force opposing the
militants in the Battle of Mosul; the leader is the command element of the military force).
In each scenario, the leader’s performance is determined by the actions and policies of
all agents, whereas the situational understanding of the followers and the decisions they
make are affected by information communicated from other followers. The information
passing between followers is, however, not necessarily accurate. Inaccurate information
is either disinformation or misinformation. Disinformation is false information spread
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deliberately to deceive, whereas misinformation is false or incorrect information spread
unintentionally (without realizing it is untrue). In the following, we refer to either type
of information as distorted. To capture the dynamic nature of warfare, we model the
problem as a general-sum partially observable stochastic game (see Hespanha and Pran-
dini 2001, Bernstein et al. 2002, Rabinovich et al. 2003, Hansen et al. 2004, Kumar and
Zilberstein 2009) with three agents, a leader and two followers. The research is intended
to provide military commanders, defense planners and military analysts with insights
pertaining to the value of distorted information in warfare. We further identify efficient
targeted investments for the leader in order to shape the IE to the leader’s advantage.
Related Literature. The study of distorted information in communication has at-
tracted the attention of both the social and computer science communities. Within the
former, Lewandowsky et al. (2012) reviewed the ways in which information is commu-
nicated and distorted information is disseminated within society while Lewandowsky
et al. (2013) used two case studies to illustrate how distorted information could be
employed to either escalate or de-escalate violent conflicts. Research in the computer
science community has focused on modeling the spread of distorted information and
developing interdiction strategies to limit the spread of distorted information in social
networks. Nguyen et al. (2012) utilized a zero-sum game to study how a defending party
can minimize the impact of distorted information spread by an adversary. Budak et al.
(2011) evaluated various approaches for limiting the spread of distorted information in
a social network, while Zhang et al. (2016) developed several algorithms to detect, with
limited budget, distorted information nodes in such networks. A survey of detecting
distorted information in social media is provided by Zubiaga et al. (2017).
In the decision analysis and game theory literatures, single-period games involving two
agents have been extensively utilized in value of information analysis. For example, Li
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(2002), Chu and Lee (2006), Meyer et al. (2010), and Leng and Parlar (2009) all ex-
amined the positive value of revealing private information, while Kamien et al. (1990)
studied problems where rewards could degrade with more accurate information. Lehrer
and Rosenberg (2010) further characterized the value-of-information function for zero-
sum repeated game with incomplete information. In the security context, Greenberg
(1982), Ma et al. (2013) and Chang et al. (2015a, 2015b) all have concentrated on
the role of distorted information using two-agent games, where the leader manipulates
the information (state, actions, etc.) available about himself that is obtainable by the
follower (the adversary); see Figure 1(a). A review of this type of information distortion
is provided by Merrick et al. (2016).
The focus of this paper is quite different from the foci encountered in the existing lit-
erature and our previous work Chang et al. (2015a, 2015b) as we study the value of
distorted information in communication for the situations depicted in Figure 1(b,c). Fig-
ure 1(b) corresponds to a non-collaborative scenario where an army has the objective
of reclaiming an area held by groups of militants. Each group of militants maintains
a position within the area and monitors the activities of the army in the vicinity of
its position. As reported in Spencer (2017), each group of militants is able to gather
information (number of opposing soldiers, types of weapons, etc.) only about the army
units operating in the vicinity of its position. However, each group of militants can share
information with other groups of militants in other positions in order to gain a more
complete picture of the army’s activities. Each group of militants uses the information
it receives from other militant groups about the army’s activities to inform its decisions,
e.g., about where to position heavy weapons, move militant soldiers, etc. In this paper,
we determine the value to the army of modulating information communicated between
groups of militants (e.g., disinformation through hijacking), in order to guide investment
decisions the army can make to affect adversary mission-essential information.
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Figure 1(c) corresponds to a collaborative scenario where a military force, consisting of
a command element and combat units, has the objective of retaking an area held by
groups of militants. Each combat unit is cognizant of the progress it is making towards
taking a position held by one of the militant groups, however each combat unit has a
less than perfect understanding of the progress other combat units are making against
other positions. Each combat unit attempts to communicate to other combat units
its position on the battlefield and uses information received from other combat units
to inform whether and where to provide fire support to other combat units. Accurate
information is vital given the close proximity of targets to the forward line of troops.
However, real-time battlefield communication is challenging (Mosul Study Group 2017).
In urban warfare, misinformation is not uncommon due to technical issues associated
with the communication technologies (Fitzgerald et al. 2014) and interference caused by
buildings and structures that impede electronic communication (Edwards 2001). Such
communication difficulties combined with the ever-changing nature of the urban envi-
ronment during warfare have resulted in combat units on the same battlefield having a
very different situational understanding, as noted in The Wall Street Journal (Gordon
2017). In this paper, we determine the value to the command element of modulating
information communicated between combat units, in order to guide investment decisions
the command element can make to preserve/improve allied mission-essential information
(e.g., through investment in advanced communication technology, development of com-
mon understanding of symbols).
We next discuss the contributions of our paper.
(i) Our developed modeling framework constitutes a first effort in timely and rig-
orously attempting to capture and analyze the value of distorted information in
communication in modern warfare from the leader’s perspective. We model the IE
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(a) In literature and
our previous work
(b) Non-cooperative games (c) Cooperative games
Figure 1: (a) Distorted information in literature and our previous work vs. distorted
information in communication for the non-cooperative (b) and cooperative games (c)
studied in this paper
as a general-sum partially observable stochastic game with three agents to capture
the dynamic nature of urban warfare. The value of distorted information in both
cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios is analyzed.
(ii) A holistic paradigm considering both the reward structures and the policy em-
ployed by each agent is suggested for analyzing the value of distorted information
in communication. Embracing such a holistic view of the reward structure, pol-
icy, and accuracy of information is imperative as considering only one of them can
lead to erroneous results. Intuition suggests that the leader’s performance should
improve (deteriorate) as the quality/accuracy of the information communicated
between adversarial (allied) followers declines. This is widely accepted in the ex-
isting literature. Herein, we demonstrate that such intuition is correct only under
certain conditions. We also discuss why the intuitive understanding of distorted
information can be false.
(iii) Mathematically, we show the leader’s value function can be represented as a power
series of information accuracy communicated between two followers. Thus, the
value function of the leader is infinitely differentiable in communication quality.
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We identify several sets of conditions under which the intuitive understanding of
distorted information is valid.
(iv) In situations where the leader would benefit from modulating the information com-
municated between followers, we analyze the connection between affecting informa-
tion accuracy and efficient investment. This analysis provides guidance to a leader
with limited resources about how to invest in the modulation of communication
between followers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem as a
one-leader, two-follower partially observable stochastic game. We state the modeling
assumptions in Section 2.1 and the model formulation in Section 2.2. Section 3 presents
the assessment of the value of distorted information. We first analyze the best response
behavior of the followers, and discuss its implication on the value of distorted infor-
mation. Subsequently, we represent the leader’s value function as a power series of
communication quality in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 analyzes the impact of the reward
structures and the polices employed by each agent on the value of distorted information.
Section 3.3 examines the cases where the analysis in Section 3.1-3.2 is not applicable.
We analyze why the intuitive understanding of distorted information could be invalid
and discuss the implications on investment decisions in Section 4. Section 5 concludes
the paper where we summarize our work and discuss future research directions.
2 The Game Setup
In this section, we model the problem as a partially observable stochastic game involving
three agents: a leader, follower 1, and follower 2. The two followers are adversaries of
the leader in a non-cooperative game as depicted in Figure 1(b) and allies of the leader
in a cooperative game as depicted in Figure 1(c).
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2.1 Model Assumptions
We assume that (i) each agent has perfect knowledge of the game setup and (ii) before
the game, the leader chooses his policy first and then the followers simultaneously select
their own policies with complete knowledge of the policy chosen by the leader. In co-
operative scenarios, the leader may directly inform allies of his policies and of the game
setup, while in non-cooperative scenarios, the adversaries may have spent a substantial
amount of time and effort in acquiring knowledge of the game and in understanding the
leader’s strategies before making any decisions (e.g., see Joint Publication 3-13 ).
We remark that knowing an agent’s policy is not equivalent to knowing the agent’s
action at each decision epoch in sequential decision making. The action of an agent is
determined by the policy of the agent in concert with the information the agent possesses.
The information possessed by an agent, however, is private and is not accessible to other
agents. We study how the real-time passing of distorted information between the two
followers can affect the decision making of the followers and hence the performance of
the leader.
2.2 Model Formulation
The decision epochs are t = 0, 1, 2, ..., and let {sk(t), t = 0, 1, ...}, {z¯k(t), t = 1, 2, ...},
and {ak(t), t = 0, 1, ...} be the state, observation, and action processes for agent k ∈
{L = leader, F1 = follower 1, F2 = follower 2}, each having finite state, observation,
and action spaces Sk, Z¯k, and Ak, respectively. Observation z¯k(t) received by agent k
contains possibly distorted information of the other two agents’ states. A follower can
independently collect partial information about the leader and share information with
the other follower through a communication channel, e.g., a social media application.
We assume: (i) the leader’s state sL(t) has two components: sL(t) = (sL1 (t), s
L
2 (t)); the
state space of the leader is given by SL = SL1 × SL2 ; (ii) follower i ∈ {1, 2} can perfectly
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observe the leader’s partial state sLi (t) at time t, whereas follower i‘s knowledge of the
leader’s partial state sL3−i(t) results from (possibly distorted) information z
Fi(t) ∈ ZFi
obtained from follower 3− i via communication channel i (see Figure 2). Assume ZFi =
SL3−i, i ∈ {1, 2}. We say the two followers accurately share information with each other
at any time to coordinate their actions if zFi(t) = sL3−i(t), ∀t. However, the existence of
distorted information in communication may result in zFi(t) 6= sL3−i(t).
Figure 2: Communication between two followers
As our focus is on the distorted information in communication between two followers,
we assume that: (i) each follower i ∈ {1, 2} has complete knowledge of his own state
and of the state of the other follower, together denoted as sF (t) = {sF1(t), sF2(t)}, hence
z¯Fi(t) = {sLi (t), zFi(t), sF3−i(t)}; and (ii) the leader can perfectly observe sF (t), hence
z¯L(t) = sF (t). We remark that all the results of this paper can be directly extended,
albeit with more complicated notation, to the case where each follower does not have
complete knowledge of the state of the other follower and where the leader’s observation
of sF (t) is less than perfect.
In the following, let s(t) = {sL(t), sF1(t), sF2(t)}, z¯(t) = {z¯L(t), z¯F1(t), z¯F2(t)} and
a(t) = {aL(t), aF1(t), aF2(t)}. Furthermore, let Q = {P (z¯(t)|s(t))} be the communi-
cation matrix (also called the observation matrix in the POMDP literature). Then
Q(z¯(t)|s(t)) = Q(z(t)|s(t)) = ∏2i=1Qi(zFi(t)|sL3−i(t)), where Qi is the communication
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matrix for channel i, i ∈ {1, 2} and z(t) = {zF1(t), zF2(t)}. The higher communication
quality of a channel, the lower the probability of distorted information being passed in
an information exchange. Let i ≥ 0 represent the probability of distorted information
in communication channel i. We thus define the communication matrix for channel
i ∈ {1, 2} as:
Qi(zFi(t)|sL3−i(t)) =

1− i if zFi(t) = sL3−i(t)
i · σsL3−i,zFi if z
Fi(t) 6= sL3−i(t),
where σsL3−i,zFi
≥ 0, σsLi ,sLi = 0,
∑
zFi∈ZFi σsL3−i,zFi = 1 for all s
L
i , i ∈ {1, 2}. We fur-
ther define ||Q|| = maxj
∑
z∈Z |qjz| for a matrix Q. Clearly, ||Qi − I|| = 2i, i ∈ {1, 2},
where I is the identity matrix. The communication quality of channel i is considered
higher if its communication matrix is given by Qi(i) rather than Q
i(′i) where i < 
′
i.
We remark that the definition of Qi is equivalent to the definition of the observation
matrix in Ortiz et al. (2013) for POMDPs. Another definition of information accuracy
in communication will be discussed later in Subsection 3.3. The conditional probability
pij(z¯, a) = P [z¯(t+1) = z¯, s(t+1) = j|s(t) = i, a(t) = a] is assumed given, and let P (z¯, a)
be the sub-stochastic matrix {pij(z¯, a)}.
Let ζk(t, τ) = {sk(t), ..., sk(t − τ + 1), z¯k(t), ..., z¯k(t − τ + 1), ak(t − 1), ..., ak(t − τ)} be
the information history at time t of finite length τ for agent k, and ζ¯ be such that ζk(t+
1, τ) = ζ¯(z¯k(t + 1), sk(t + 1), ak(t), ζk(t, τ)). Let ζ l,p(t, τ) = (ζ l(t, τ), ζp(t, τ)), ζ(t, τ) =
(ζL(t, τ), ζF1(t, τ), ζF2(t, τ)), and yk(t) = {P (ζ l,p(t, τ)|ζk(t))} for l 6= p 6= k, where
yk(t) is a “belief” array indicating what agent k infers about the other two agents’
information histories ζ l,p(t, τ), l 6= p 6= k, l, p, k ∈ {L,F1, F2}. Assume the initial be-
lief yk(0) = {P (ζ l,p(0, τ))} is given. Let ζk(t) = {z¯k(t), ..., z¯k(1), sk(t), ..., sk(0), ak(t −
1), ..., ak(0), yk(0)} when t ≥ 1, hence, ζk(t) = {z¯k(t), sk(t), ak(t − 1), ζk(t − 1)}. A
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policy δk is called a perfect-memory policy if agent k selects ak(t) on the basis of com-
plete information history ζk(t); it is called a finite-memory policy if agent k selects ak(t)
on the basis of finite information history ζk(t, τ). In this paper, we assume the poli-
cies employed by the leader and followers are finite-memory policies. For simplicity, we
define δ = (δL, δF1 , δF2), and δ(ζ(t, τ)) = (δL(ζL(t, τ)), δF1(ζF1(t, τ)), δF2(ζF2(t, τ))) =
P (a(t)|ζ(t, τ)), where P (a(t)|ζ(t, τ)) = ∏k∈{L,F1,F2} P (ak(t)|ζk(t, τ)). We remark that
ζk(t, τ) is private information of agent k and it is only known by the agent. Hence, agent
l can only infer agent k’s action even if agent l knows the policy of agent k, k 6= l. For
simplicity, we further denote:
(i) ζ¯(s(t+1), sL2 (t+1), s
L
1 (t+1), ζ(t, τ), δ(ζ(t, τ))) = {ζ¯(s(t+1), ζL(t, τ), δL(ζL(t, τ))), ζ¯(s(t+
1), ζF1(t, τ), δF1(ζF1(t, τ))), ζ¯(s(t+1), ζF2(t, τ), δF2(ζF2(t, τ)))} (each agent receives
accurate information at time t+ 1);
(ii) ζ¯(s(t+1), zF1(t+1), sL1 (t+1), ζ(t, τ), δ(ζ(t, τ))) = {ζ¯(s(t+1), ζL(t, τ), δL(ζL(t, τ))), ζ¯(sL1 (t+
1), zF1(t+1), sF (t+1), ζF1(t, τ), δF1(ζF1(t, τ))), ζ¯(s(t+1), ζF2(t, τ), δF2(ζF2(t, τ)))}
(follower 1 receives inaccurate information but others’ information are accurate at
time t+ 1);
(iii) ζ¯(s(t+1), sL2 (t+1), z
F2(t+1), ζ(t, τ), δ(ζ(t, τ))) = {ζ¯(s(t+1), ζL(t, τ), δL(ζL(t, τ))), ζ¯(s(t+
1), ζF1(t, τ), δF1(ζF1(t, τ))), ζ¯(zF2(t+1), sL2 (t+1), s
F (t+1), ζF2(t, τ), δF2(ζF2(t, τ)))}
(follower 2 receives inaccurate information but others’ information are accurate at
time t+ 1);
(iv) ζ¯(s(t+1), zF1(t+1), zF2(t+1), ζ(t, τ), δ(ζ(t, τ))) = {ζ¯(s(t+1), ζL(t, τ), δL(ζL(t, τ))), ζ¯(sL1 (t+
1), zF1(t+1), sF (t+1), ζF1(t, τ), δF1(ζF1(t, τ))), ζ¯(zF2(t+1), sL2 (t+1), s
F (t+1), ζF2(t, τ), δF2(ζF2(t, τ)))}
(both followers receive inaccurate information at time t+ 1).
Let rk(s(t), a(t)) be the scalar reward received by agent k at epoch t with state s(t)
and action a(t). Let vkδ (ζ
k(0)) be the agent k’s value function under a leader policy
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δL, follower 1’s policy δF1 , and follower 2’s policy δF2 , with the communication ma-
trix Q(1, 2). As the exact ending period of a war front is unknown, the criterion
of agent k is the infinite horizon, expected total discounted reward, i.e., vkδ (ζ
k(0)) =
E{∑t βtrk(s(t), a(t))|ζk(0)}, where E{.|ζk(0)} is the expectation operator conditioned
on ζk(0) and where we assume the discount factor β is such that 0 ≤ β < 1. The dis-
count factor can be interpreted as that there is a probability of 1 − β that the warfare
terminates and no further rewards/costs are realized.
We assume initial information condition ζ(0) is given. Let Πk be the set of all finite-
memory policies for agent k, k ∈ {L,F1, F2}, and Q be the set of all communication
matrices Q = {P (z(t)|s(t))}. We assume each agent wants to maximize the expected
total discounted reward. Thus, the goal of follower i is to maximize vFi by choosing the
best response function pii,∗ : ΠL ×ΠF3−i × Q→ ΠFi such that ∀δL ∈ ΠL, Q ∈ Q,
vFi(δL, pii,∗(δL, pi3−i,∗, Q), pi3−i,∗(δL, pii,∗, Q))(ζFi(0)) ≥ vFi(δL, ρFi , pi3−i,∗(δL, ρFi , Q))(ζFi(0)),
∀ρFi ∈ ΠFi , i ∈ {1, 2}. (1)
Similarly, the goal of the leader is to maximize vL, taking into consideration the best
response policy of each follower; that is,
vL(piL, piF1,∗(piL, piF2,∗, Q), piF2,∗(piL, piF1,∗, Q))(ζL(0))
≥ vL(δL, piF1,∗(δL, piF2,∗, Q), piF2,∗(δL, piF1,∗, Q))(ζL(0)),∀δL ∈ ΠL. (2)
We remark that searching for the equilibrium policies for the two followers for any given
δL ∈ ΠL is a classical decentralized POMDP (Dec-POMDP). Dec-POMDP is NEXP-
complete and a survey of solution techniques for Dec-POMDPs can be found in Oliehoek
(2012). We focus on the impact of distorted information in communication (as defined by
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Q(1, 2)) on the leader’s value function v
L(δL, piF1,∗(δL, piF2,∗, Q), piF2,∗(δL, piF1,∗, Q))(ζL(0))
for any given leader policy δL ∈ ΠL (either optimal or sub-optimal). Developing efficient
algorithms to determine optimal leader policies is beyond the scope of this paper and is
an interesting research topic.
3 Value of Distorted Information
In this section, we investigate the impact of distorted information in communication
between the two followers on the performance of the leader for any given policy of the
leader. Specifically, we analyze how the leader’s value function vL changes as the prob-
ability of having distorted information in communication 1, 2 changes, assuming that
a finite-memory leader policy δL and initial conditions ζ = (ζL, ζF1 , ζF2) are given. We
proceed by first analyzing the best response policies of the two followers.
The space of communication quality is Q = {(1, 2) : 0 ≤ 1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 2 ≤ 1}. It
is clear that the best response policy pair for the followers (δF1 , δF2) is a function of
communication quality (1, 2), i.e., δ
Fi = piFi,∗(δL, piF3−i,∗, 1, 2), i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 1. Assume (δF1 , δF2) is the best response policy pair for the followers for
communication quality (1, 2). Then there exist ci ≥ 0 such that if |i − ′i| ≤ ci, i =
{1, 2}, (δF1 , δF2) remains the best response policy pair for communication quality (′1, ′2).
The values of c1, c2 is determined in the proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A. Propo-
sition 1 indicates that the distorted information will affect the leader’s value function
depending on the magnitude of distorted information as discussed below.
(i) If the changes of the magnitude of distorted information (in terms of probability
1, 2) are relatively small, the followers will not change their best response policies.
Rather, they will select their actions according to the distorted information where
the policy of each follower δFi , i ∈ {1, 2} remains optimal. A policy δk : ζk → Ak is a
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mapping from private information history ζk to the corresponding action space Ak.
This analysis explores the pure effect of distorted information in communication
ζk when the policy of each agent δk is fixed. The leader’s performance is affected
only by the changes of the followers’ actions.
(ii) If the changes of the magnitude of distorted information are large enough, the
followers may adjust their corresponding best response policies. In this case, at
least one of δFi , i ∈ {1, 2} is changed. Hence, the distorted information will alter
the leader’s value function through the adjustment of both policies and actions.
As the followers may switch to completely different policies for case (ii), it can be shown
by extending the analysis in Chang et al. (2015b) that: (a) the leader’s value function
may experience discontinuities, and (b) such discontinuities could be favorable or unfa-
vorable to the leader. For example, an attempt by the leader to worsen the quality of
communication between adversarial followers may result in the followers switching to a
different and potentially less compromised channel of communication, which is unlikely
to be to the leader’s benefit. As obtaining these results is fairly straightforward, case
(ii) is not considered in this paper.
Rather, the focus of this paper is on assessing the merit of modulating distorted infor-
mation in communication for case (i). We propose and argue that a holistic paradigm,
taking into account both the reward structures and the policy employed by each agent
is necessary for determining the value of distorted information in communication. To
that end, we employ the structured approach discussed below.
(1) We identify conditions under which the leader’s value function vL can be represented
by a power series in 1 and 2 (Subsection 3.1). Thus, the leader’s value function is
infinitely differentiable. Furthermore, for small 1, 2, the signs of the coefficients of
the lower order terms in the power series determine the value of distorted information
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in communication to the leader.
(2) Assume the conditions of (1) hold:
(i) We establish the existence of the cases where less accurate information com-
municated between adversaries (allies) can improve (degrade) the performance
of the leader (Proposition 2) in Subsection 3.2, by investigating simple zero-
memory policies in a totally cooperative/non-cooperative game. More impor-
tantly, we demonstrate by example cases that: (a) degraded communication
quality between adversaries (allies) does not necessarily lead to an improved
(a worsened) leader’s performance, and (b) the value of distorted information
depends on the specific reward structures among the agents (i.e., zero-sum,
general-sum, totally collaborative) and the policy employed by each agent.
(ii) We relax the assumptions of zero-memory policies and the perfectly aligned
(directly opposite) reward structure in (i) in order to identify a range of reward
structures and general finite-memory policies for which the intuitive value of
distorted information remains intact. We do so by investigating to what extent
the reward structure and policies can deviate from the ones identified in (i).
(iii) We also support our thesis that the value of information depends on the policies
employed, by demonstrating the simple fact that for any reward structure, the
information has no value when the followers totally ignore it in their responses.
(3) Finally, in Subsection 3.3, we discuss the case when the conditions of (1) do not
hold, namely, when the power series does not converge or higher order terms in the
series have to be considered.
3.1 The Leader’s Value Function as a Power Series in (1, 2)
It is easy to show by standard POMDP techniques that {ζL(t, τ), yL(t)} is a sufficient
statistic for {ζL(t)}, where yL(t) = P (ζF (t, τ)|ζL(t)). Hence, vLδ (ζL(t)) = vLδ (ζL(t, τ), yL(t)).
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We suppress the notation for time t for notational simplicity throughout the rest of the
paper. Let αk,l be a real-valued vector over {ζ},∀k, l ≥ 0. For any vector u ∈ Rn, we
say u ≤ 0, if u(i) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, ..., n; u ≥ 0 if u(i) ≥ 0,∀i = 1, ..., n; and u is unsigned
otherwise.
Lemma 1. Assume ak,l ≤ c(ak−1,l + ak,l−1) + 2cak−1,l−1, where a, c > 0, a0,0 ≤ 1,
a0,l ≤ cl, and ak,0 ≤ ck.
(i) For c ≥ 1/4, ak,l ≤ (4c)l+k, ∀k, l ≥ 0;
(ii) For 0 < c < 1/4, ak,l ≤ (4c)max(k,l), ∀k, l ≥ 0.
Theorem 1. There is a unique real-valued function g on {ζ} satisfying vL(ζL, yL) =∑
ζF y
L(ζF )gL(ζL, ζF ). Furthermore, gL can be represented by a sequence of vectors
{αk,l}k,l≥0 as gL =
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=0 
k
1
l
2α
k,l, where the sequence converges for:
(i) ∀0 < 1, 2 < 1, if 0 < β ≤ 1/9;
(ii) ∀0 < 1, 2 < 1−β8β , if 1/9 < β < 1.
Hence, vL(ζL, yL) is infinitely differentiable in 1, 2.
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of three major steps. In the first step, we show that
the function g is the unique solution to an equation analogous to POMDPs with finite-
memory policies. Mathematical induction is then employed to represent g as a power
series of 1, 2. The convergence result follows Lemma 1. Detailed proof is presented in
the Appendix.
Theorem 1 implies that the leader’ value function is infinitely differentiable in 1, 2.
Furthermore, for 1, 2 sufficiently small, the value of distorted information in commu-
nication can be easily determined by determining the signs of α1,0 and α0,1. If the
joint policies (δL, δF1 , δF2) are such that α1,0 ≤ 0 (or α0,1 ≤ 0), then the leader’s value
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function can be improved by reducing the probability of having distorted information in
communication between two followers, i.e., with smaller 1 (or 2). However, if α
1,0 ≥ 0
(or α0,1 ≥ 0), then decreasing the probability of having distorted information 1 (or 2)
may decrease the leader’s value function. If α1,0 (or α0,1) is unsigned, then the value of
yL will determine whether it is worthwhile and, if so, in which direction to change the
probability of distorted information communicated between the two followers.
3.2 The Impact of Reward Structures and Policies
Below, we first demonstrate that there exist reward structures and simple finite memory
policies (zero-memory) under which α1,0, α0,1 ≤ (≥)0. We then discuss the impact of
reward structures and policies on the value of distorted information. Let Q = Q(1, 2)
and Q′ = Q′(′1, ′2) where i ≤ ′i, i = {1, 2}.
3.2.1 The Existence
Proposition 2. Assume rF1 = rF2 = rF and a zero-memory leader policy δL : S → AL
is given. Let δF1∗ : SL1 × ZF1 × SF → AF1 and δF2∗ : SL2 × ZF2 × SF → AF2 be the
followers’ best response zero-memory policies, i.e., they satisfy
vF∗(s) = max
aF
{
RF (s, δL(s), aF ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δL(s), aF )vF∗(s′)
}
, (3)
For i, 
′
i sufficiently small, i = 1, 2,
(1) If rL = rF , then α1,0, α0,1 ≤ 0, and vLQ′(ζL, yL) ≤ vLQ(ζL, yL);
(2) If rL = −rF , then α1,0, α0,1 ≥ 0, and vLQ′(ζL, yL) ≥ vLQ(ζL, yL) .
Intuitively, communicating more accurate information between two allies should im-
prove the leader’s performance; communicating less accurate information between two
adversaries should improve the leader’s performance. Proposition 2 verifies this intuition
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under the conditions that (i) the reward structures are perfectly aligned (or exactly the
opposite), and (ii) the followers are using their best response zero-memory policies for
1 = 2 = 0 (the policies remain optimal for small 1, 2 > 0 as guaranteed by Proposi-
tion 1). Although this result is not unexpected, Proposition 2 also implies the necessity
of taking into account reward structures and policies to avoid misusing distorted in-
formation. Below, we further demonstrate that the intuition may not be always true.
Examples 1 and 2 consider simple scenarios depicted in Figure 1(b,c) in order to illus-
trate the importance of the reward structures, while Examples 3 and 4 further analyze
the impact of policies. In order to reduce computational complexity, we assume the
leader’s policy δL : S → AL, is fixed. The meaning and the value of each parameter are
provided in the Appendix.
Example 1. (Impact of Reward Structures: Non-cooperative) For a simple case of
the scenario in Figure 1(b), consider an area held by two groups of militants, each in
its own position monitoring army activities in vicinity of the position. The intensity
of army activity in vicinity of a position can be high (H) or low (L). Thus, the state
space of the army is SL = (H,H), (H,L), (L,H), (L,L). Let H = 1, L = 0 for simplic-
ity. The militants dynamically move their limited number of heavy weapons between
the two positions to meet their needs. Hence, the state space of the militants is SF =
{heavy weapons with group 1 (= 0), heavy weapons with group 2 (= 1)}. Each militant
group collects information on the activity level of the army in vicinity of its position and
shares it to the other group. Thus, Zi = SLi . The policy of the army is predetermined
and given, e.g., units may reconnoiter in vicinity of a position, troops may be moved to
the position in the area where the militants have no heavy weapons, etc. The actions
available to a group of militants are to (i) use all weapons including heavy weapons if
available (= 0), or (ii) use light weapons and move heavy weapons to the other group
(= 1).
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The reward structure of the army rL(s, a) consists of two parts: the number of army
troops killed by the militants at each decision epoch and a measure of the area reclaimed.
The reward structure of the militants can be difficult to specify as it depends on a wide
range of (possibly unknown) issues, e.g., consequence/damage, impact of propaganda
and symbolic purposes, etc. (Bier et al. 2007). We thus consider two games: (i) the re-
ward of the militants is directly opposite to that of the army, i.e., rF = −rL (a zero-sum
game), and (ii) the signs of rL(s, a) and rF (s, a) are the opposite but their absolute values
are not the same, i.e., |rL| 6= |rF |. Namely, a failure to the army is a success to the mil-
itants, however, the army places different values on failure compared to the values that
the militants place on their own successes. In each game the followers’ employ policies
that are optimal (under no distorted information). The numerical results found in Table
1 show α1,0, α0,1 ≥ 0 if rL = −rF as per Proposition 2. However, if |rL| 6= |rF |, α1,0 and
α0,1 can be unsigned (neither positive nor negative). Consequently, distorting informa-
tion shared between adversaries in such situations may not lead to an improvement of
the leader’s performance. Furthermore, the value of distorted information depends on
the value of the leader’s belief yL as well.
Example 2. (Impact of Reward Structures: Cooperative) For a simple case of the
scenario depicted by Figure 1(c), consider a military force consisting of a command ele-
ment (the leader) and two combat units (allied followers). Each combat unit is opposed
by a group of militants. The operations of a combat unit against a group of militants
can be defined as either close (C) or deep (D). Formally, deep operations are operations
conducted against uncommitted enemy forces, while close operations are operations di-
rected against enemy forces already engaged in battle (Department of the Army 2016).
Here we use the terms close and deep simply to denote one place on the battlefield versus
another. In an urban setting close and deep may be only a few blocks apart making fire
support potentially lethal to friendly forces if the information communicated between
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ζ
Game 1 Game 2
ζ
Game 1 Game 2
α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0
[0 0] [0 0] 0 10.77 5.11 2.90 0.14 [1 0] [0 0] 0 13.00 6.37 -0.50 0.15
[0 1] [0 0] 0 11.81 3.24 2.90 0.14 [1 1] [0 0] 0 13.00 6.37 -0.50 0.15
[0 0] [1 0] 0 12.80 3.87 2.90 0.14 [1 0] [1 0] 0 10.86 4.77 -0.50 0.15
[0 1] [1 0] 0 14.39 5.81 2.90 0.14 [1 1] [1 0] 0 10.86 4.77 -0.50 0.15
[0 0] [0 0] 1 9.38 3.19 -0.54 0.02 [1 0] [0 0] 1 11.19 4.02 -0.69 -0.22
[0 1] [0 0] 1 9.38 3.19 -3.97 0.01 [1 1] [0 0] 1 11.19 4.02 -0.69 -0.22
[0 0] [1 0] 1 9.38 3.19 -0.54 0.02 [1 0] [1 0] 1 11.19 4.02 -0.69 -0.22
[0 1] [1 0] 1 9.38 3.19 -3.97 0.01 [1 1] [1 0] 1 11.19 4.02 -0.69 -0.22
[0 0] [0 1] 0 12.20 4.79 -1.05 0.00 [1 0] [0 1] 0 13.13 4.04 -1.93 -0.09
[0 1] [0 1] 0 14.70 3.70 -1.05 0.00 [1 1] [0 1] 0 13.13 4.04 -1.93 -0.09
[0 0] [1 1] 0 12.20 4.79 1.59 0.01 [1 0] [1 1] 0 13.13 4.04 -1.75 0.15
[0 1] [1 1] 0 14.70 3.70 1.59 0.01 [1 1] [1 1] 0 13.13 4.04 -1.75 0.15
[0 0] [0 1] 1 13.66 4.19 -2.67 -0.29 [1 0] [0 1] 1 15.26 3.56 -1.87 0.08
[0 1] [0 1] 1 13.66 4.19 1.27 0.03 [1 1] [0 1] 1 15.26 3.56 -1.87 0.08
[0 0] [1 1] 1 13.66 4.19 0.15 -0.22 [1 0] [1 1] 1 15.26 3.56 2.90 0.02
[0 1] [1 1] 1 13.66 4.19 -0.44 -0.11 [1 1] [1 1] 1 15.26 3.56 2.90 0.02
Table 1: α vectors for the non-cooperative games in Example 1 where ζ =
([sL1 , z
F1 ], [zF2 , sL2 ], s
F )
units about battlefield position is not accurate. The state space of the command element
is SL = {(C,C), (D,C), (C,D), (D,D)}. Again, for simplicity, let C = 0, D = 1. As the
militants possess limited heavy weaponry, we assume only one group of militants has
heavy weapons at any point in time, hence SF = {combat unit 1 facing heavy weapons
(= 0), combat unit 2 facing heavy weapons (= 1)}. Each combat unit communicates to
the other one information about its position and implicitly the state of the command
element. Thus, Zi = SLi . The command element formulates the plan of attack on the
militants. The actions available to each combat unit are to attack either (i) the mili-
tant group opposing it (= 0), or (ii) the militant group opposing the other combat unit
through the provision of fire support (= 1).
In warfare it is not uncommon for military forces to be composed of troops from different
nations and thus the reward structure of each agent may not be exactly the same. For
example, the reward structure of the lead command is a function of terrain taken per
period, while the reward structure of each combat unit is a function of terrain taken and
the number of casualties incurred. We thus again consider two games. In each game the
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ζ
Game 1 Game 2
ζ
Game 1 Game 2
α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0
[0 0] [0 0] 0 -20.49 -7.57 -2.74 -2.81 [1 0] [0 0] 0 -21.66 -8.18 2.10 0.93
[0 1] [0 0] 0 -20.49 -7.57 -2.74 -2.81 [1 1] [0 0] 0 -20.79 -6.82 1.45 0.08
[0 0] [1 0] 0 -22.55 -10.37 2.35 2.11 [1 0] [1 0] 0 -21.03 -7.97 1.35 1.83
[0 1] [1 0] 0 -22.55 -10.37 2.35 2.11 [1 1] [1 0] 0 -18.99 -8.73 -1.49 -1.14
[0 0] [0 0] 1 -23.96 -8.85 -2.00 -1.91 [1 0] [0 0] 1 -20.86 -8.37 1.84 1.21
[0 1] [0 0] 1 -23.96 -8.85 -2.00 -1.91 [1 1] [0 0] 1 -20.07 -6.49 1.84 1.21
[0 0] [1 0] 1 -22.42 -9.63 -2.00 -1.91 [1 0] [1 0] 1 -17.68 -6.8 1.84 1.21
[0 1] [1 0] 1 -22.42 -9.63 -2.00 -1.91 [1 1] [1 0] 1 -18.79 -6.34 1.84 1.21
[0 0] [0 1] 0 -15.97 -7.67 1.31 0.50 [1 0] [0 1] 0 -21.25 -6.48 3.78 3.11
[0 1] [0 1] 0 -15.97 -7.67 1.31 0.50 [1 1] [0 1] 0 -21.93 -8.11 3.93 3.50
[0 0] [1 1] 0 -23.98 -9.24 0.63 0.55 [1 0] [1 1] 0 -17.95 -7.20 0.79 -0.52
[0 1] [1 1] 0 -23.98 -9.24 0.63 0.55 [1 1] [1 1] 0 -18.53 -10.25 -2.39 -3.43
[0 0] [0 1] 1 -22.37 -9.04 2.99 2.00 [1 0] [0 1] 1 -21.79 -7.78 0.15 -0.86
[0 1] [0 1] 1 -22.37 -9.04 2.99 2.00 [1 1] [0 1] 1 -19.9 -4.99 0.15 -0.86
[0 0] [1 1] 1 -22.37 -9.04 0.68 0.08 [1 0] [1 1] 1 -21.79 -7.78 1.24 1.28
[0 1] [1 1] 1 -22.37 -9.04 0.68 0.08 [1 1] [1 1] 1 -19.9 -4.99 1.24 1.28
Table 2: α vectors for the cooperative games in Example 2 where ζ =
([sL1 , z
F1 ], [zF2 , sL2 ], s
F )
followers’ policies are optimal (under no distorted information). The first game assumes
rL = rF1 = rF2 , i.e., a totally cooperative game. The results in Table 2 show that
α1,0, α0,1 ≤ 0, as dictated by Proposition 2. The second game is where the signs of
rL(s, a) and rF (s, a) are the same but rL 6= rF . The numerical results show that α1,0
and α0,1 can be unsigned. Consequently, more accurate information sharing between the
two allies does not guarantee an improvement in the leader’s performance.
Example 3. (Impact of Policies: Myopic Policy) Example 2 continued. We now com-
pare the values of α1,0 and α0,1 under two different followers’ response policies in Table
3, assuming rL = rF1 = rF2 . The first response policies satisfy the optimality equation
(3). Hence, all elements of α0,1 and α1,0 are non-positive as per Proposition 2, indicating
more accurate information in communication between two allies can indeed improve the
leader’s performance. The second response policies are myopic in that the two followers
will select the action aF∗ such that rF (s, δL(s), aF∗) = maxaF∈AF rF (s, δL(s), aF ) for
each s, ∀t. The signs of α0,1 and α1,0 are, however, unsigned. The value of distorted
information will also depend on the belief vector yL.
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ζ
Optimal in (3) Myopic
ζ
Optimal in (3) Myopic
α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0
[0 0] [0 0] 0 -19.16 -4.85 0.62 0.62 [1 0] [0 0] 0 -13.11 -5.59 -0.82 -0.74
[0 1] [0 0] 0 -19.16 -4.85 0.62 0.62 [1 1] [0 0] 0 -13.11 -5.59 -0.82 -0.74
[0 0] [1 0] 0 -14.05 -4.65 0.62 0.62 [1 0] [1 0] 0 -13.87 -5.19 -0.82 -0.74
[0 1] [1 0] 0 -14.05 -4.65 0.62 0.62 [1 1] [1 0] 0 -13.87 -5.19 -0.82 -0.74
[0 0] [0 0] 1 -15.44 -5.23 0.03 0.03 [1 0] [0 0] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.24 0.24
[0 1] [0 0] 1 -8.64 -7.55 -0.76 -0.76 [1 1] [0 0] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.24 0.24
[0 0] [1 0] 1 -15.44 -5.23 -0.76 -0.76 [1 0] [1 0] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.81 0.81
[0 1] [1 0] 1 -8.64 -7.55 1.00 1.00 [1 1] [1 0] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.81 0.81
[0 0] [0 1] 0 -13.87 -5.19 -0.74 -0.82 [1 0] [0 1] 0 -23.5 -3.34 -0.52 -0.52
[0 1] [0 1] 0 -13.87 -5.19 -0.74 -0.82 [1 1] [0 1] 0 -23.5 -3.34 -0.52 -0.52
[0 0] [1 1] 0 -13.11 -5.69 -0.74 -0.82 [1 0] [1 1] 0 -17.46 -6.34 -0.52 -0.52
[0 1] [1 1] 0 -13.11 -5.69 -0.74 -0.82 [1 1] [1 1] 0 -17.46 -6.34 -0.52 -0.52
[0 0] [0 1] 1 -16.5 -4.27 0.24 0.24 [1 0] [0 1] 1 -12.9 -5.53 -0.57 -0.57
[0 1] [0 1] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.81 0.81 [1 1] [0 1] 1 -12.9 -5.53 -0.57 -0.57
[0 0] [1 1] 1 -16.5 -4.27 0.24 0.24 [1 0] [1 1] 1 -12.9 -5.53 -0.57 -0.57
[0 1] [1 1] 1 -10.72 -5.55 0.81 0.81 [1 1] [1 1] 1 -12.9 -5.53 -0.57 -0.57
Table 3: α vector for a myopic policy in Example 3 where ζ = ([sL1 , z
F1 ], [zF2 , sL2 ], s
F )
Example 4. (Impact of Policies: k-Step Ahead Policy) Example 2 continued. As-
suming rL = rF1 = rF2 , we further compare the values of α1,0 and α0,1 under a k-step
ahead policy in Table 4. The optimal policy (under no distorted information) is also a
4-step ahead policy, where all elements of α0,1 and α1,0 are negative as expected. It is
noteworthy that even under a 3-step ahead policy (just 1-step away from optimal), the
vector α1,0 is still greater than zero. Thus, more accurate information sharing between
allies may not necessarily improve the leader’s value function even under some good
sub-optimal policies.
So far, we have employed the assumption of zero-memory policies and established con-
ditions under which the value of distorted information is intuitively sound. If these
conditions are violated, however, the intuition may not hold as demonstrated by rele-
vant examples. We further remark these examples are not rare. Out of 500,000 randomly
generated examples similar to Examples 1-4 with a variety of sizes for the state spaces,
action spaces, and observation spaces, 10.1% of the examples violated the intuition.
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ζ
Optimal in (3) 3-step ahead
ζ
Optimal in (3) 3-step ahead
α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0 α0,1 α1,0
[0 0] [0 0] 0 -23736.86 -406.95 -17492.31 211.92 [1 0] [0 0] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08
[0 1] [0 0] 0 -23736.86 -406.95 -17492.31 211.92 [1 1] [0 0] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08
[0 0] [1 0] 0 -23736.86 -406.95 -17492.31 211.92 [1 0] [1 0] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08
[0 1] [1 0] 0 -23736.86 -406.95 -17492.31 211.92 [1 1] [1 0] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08
[0 0] [0 0] 1 -23727.83 -404.17 -17471.76 217.15 [1 0] [0 0] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17463.76 214.73
[0 1] [0 0] 1 -23622.41 -407.81 -17293.29 221.15 [1 1] [0 0] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17500.42 213.6
[0 0] [1 0] 1 -23727.83 -404.17 -17471.76 217.15 [1 0] [1 0] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17463.76 214.73
[0 1] [1 0] 1 -23622.41 -407.81 -17293.29 221.15 [1 1] [1 0] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17500.42 213.6
[0 0] [0 1] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08 [1 0] [0 1] 0 -23665.64 -409.74 -17413.94 208.88
[0 1] [0 1] 0 -23612.46 -407.57 -17286.38 220.08 [1 1] [0 1] 0 -23665.64 -409.74 -17413.94 208.88
[0 0] [1 1] 0 -23722.95 -406.5 -17503.54 210.87 [1 0] [1 1] 0 -23883.22 -403.81 -17705.59 209.86
[0 1] [1 1] 0 -23722.95 -406.5 -17503.54 210.87 [1 1] [1 1] 0 -23883.22 -403.81 -17705.59 209.86
[0 0] [0 1] 1 -23741.84 -405.08 -17500.42 213.6 [1 0] [0 1] 1 -23795.26 -405.59 -17604.43 207.35
[0 1] [0 1] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17463.76 214.73 [1 1] [0 1] 1 -23795.26 -405.59 -17232.05 224.17
[0 0] [1 1] 1 -23741.84 -405.08 -17500.42 213.6 [1 0] [1 1] 1 -23795.26 -405.59 -17604.43 207.35
[0 1] [1 1] 1 -23722.75 -406.78 -17463.76 214.73 [1 1] [1 1] 1 -23795.26 -405.59 -17232.05 224.17
Table 4: α vector for a k-step ahead policy in Example 4 where ζ =
([sL1 , z
F1 ], [zF2 , sL2 ], s
F )
3.2.2 General Cases
We now relax the assumption of zero-memory policies and investigate a range of reward
structures and general finite memory policies within which our intuitive understand-
ing for distorted information still holds. The objective of this analysis to address the
question: to what degree can the reward structures and policies deviate from the ones
identified in Proposition 2 such that the prevalent intuition remains valid.
Assume there exists a reward structure r∗ = (rL,∗, rF1,∗, rF2,∗) and a policy tuple δ∗ =
(δL, δF1,∗, δF2,∗) ∈ Π = ΠL × ΠF1 × ΠF2 , where α1,0δ∗ , α0,1δ∗ < 0, which we call the “nomi-
nal” reward structure and policy tuple (their existence is guaranteed as per Proposition
2). We now investigate how far a reward structure r = (rL, rF1 , rF2) and a policy tuple
δ = (δL, δF1 , δF2) ∈ Π can deviate from the nominal ones such that α1,0δ , α0,1δ ≤ 0. The
conditions for which α1,0δ , α
0,1
δ ≥ 0 can be found in a similar manner and thus are omitted.
Let U be the set of all bounded, real-valued functions on {ζ}. Let ||u|| = maxζ |u(ζ)| for
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a vector u. ∀δ, δ′ ∈ Π, define the distance function on Π by:
d(δ, δ′)
= sup
||u||≤1,u∈U
||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||.
(4)
Lemma 2.
(a) ||P (δ)− P (δ′)|| ≤ d(δ, δ′) ≤ 2,
(b) If δ and δ′ are all zero memory policies, d(δ, δ′) = ||P (δ)− P (δ′)||.
Assume α1,0δ∗ < 0 and α
0,1
δ∗ < 0, and let h1 = |maxζ α1,0δ∗ (ζ)| and h2 = |maxζ α0,1δ∗ (ζ)|.
Theorem 2. Let η1 = ||α1,0δ∗ ||+||
∑
zF1 6=sL2 σsL2 ,zF1α
0,0
δ∗ (ζ¯(s, z
F1 , sL1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))−α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ∗(ζ)))||,
η2 = ||α0,1δ∗ || + ||
∑
zF2 6=sL1 σsL1 ,zF2α
0,0
δ∗ (ζ¯(s, s
L
2 , z
F2 , ζ, δ∗(ζ))) − α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ∗(ζ)))||.
Then, for any finite memory policy tuple δ ∈ Π, α1,0δ , α0,1δ ≤ 0 if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
d(δ, δ∗)η1 +
|| ∑
zF1 6=sL2
σsL2 ,zF1
[
α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, z
F1 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s, zF1 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))
]
||

+
(
||α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
)
≤ 1− β
β
h1,
d(δ, δ∗)η2 +
|| ∑
zF2 6=sL1
σsL1 ,zF2
[
α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, s
L
2 , z
F2 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s, sL1 , zF2 , ζ, δ(ζ)))
]
||

+
(
||α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
)
≤ 1− β
β
h2.
Corollary 1. Assume both δ∗ and δ are zero-memory policy tuples.
Let η1 = ||α1,0δ∗ || + ||
∑
zF1 6=sL2 σsL2 ,zF1α
0,0
δ∗ ({s, zF1 , sL1 }) − α0,0δ∗ ({s, sL2 , sL1 })||, and η2 =
||α0,1δ∗ ||+ ||
∑
zF2 6=sL1 σsL1 ,zF2α
0,0
δ∗ ({s, sL2 , zF2})−α0,0δ∗ ({s, sL2 , sL1 }))||. Then, α1,0δ , α0,1δ ≤ 0 if
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the following two conditions are satisfied:
ηi||P (δ)− P (δ∗)||+ 2||α0,0δ∗ − α0,0δ || ≤
1− β
β
hi, i = {1, 2}. (5)
Theorem 2 provides sufficient conditions for any finite memory policies, while Corollary
1 focuses specifically on zero-memory policies. Thus, the value of distorted information
for an arbitrary reward structure and a policy tuple can be determined by examining
d(δ, δ∗) and the distance of α0,0δ to the nominal value α
0,0
δ∗ . We remark that the condi-
tions established in both Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 are only sufficient conditions and
therefore, sometimes can be conservative. Investigating the existence of necessary and
sufficient conditions appears to be an interesting research topic. Below, we employ Ex-
amples 5 and 6 for assessing holistically the impact of reward structure and policy on
the value of distorted information. Specifically, we illustrate how the value of distorted
information changes as we deviate from the conditions established in Proposition 2.
Example 5. Continuation of Examples 1 and 2. Let rF,∗ = −rL (rF,∗ = rL) and let
rF,nc (rF,c) be the reward structure of the two followers in the second game in Example
1 (Example 2). Construct a series of reward structures for the two followers by rF =
λrF,∗ + (1 − λ)rF,nc (rF = λrF,∗ + (1 − λ)rF,c), λ ∈ [0, 1]. For any λ, optimal response
policies are employed by the two followers. Figure 3 shows how the value of distorted
information evolves as the reward structure changes. Specifically, it shows how the
percentage of positive components in α1,0 changes as λ increases. Note that any game
with λ ∈ [0, 1] is a non-cooperative example of Figure 1(b) (a cooperative example of
Figure 1(c)); however, α1,0 ≥ 0 (α1,0 ≤ 0) only if the reward structure is close enough
to the zero-sum (totally cooperative) case.
Example 6. As shown in Example 4, for a given leader’s policy δL, there may not
exist a k-step ahead policy δF around the optimal policy δF,∗ such that α1,0
(δL,δF )
< 0
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(a) non-cooperative situations
(b) cooperative situations
Figure 3: Value of distorted information as the reward structure changes in Example 5
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Figure 4: Value of distorted information as policy changes in Example 6
and α0,1
(δL,δF )
< 0. We thus construct a series of randomized policies by ρF = (1 −
λ)δF,3 + λδF,∗, λ ∈ [0, 1], where δF,3 is the 3-step ahead policy pair and δF,∗ is the
optimal policy pair for the followers of Example 4. Results in Table 4 show α1,0
(δL,δF,3)
> 0
but α1,0
(δL,δF,∗) < 0 (both α
1,0
(δL,δF,3)
and α1,0
(δL,δF,∗) ≥ 0). Figure 4 shows how the value of
distorted information evolves as the policy changes from sub-optimal to optimal for the
case under consideration. Specifically, it depicts the percentage of positive components in
α1,0
(δL,ρF )
decreasing as λ increases (i.e., δF moves from δF,3 to δF,∗). Clearly, α1,0
(δL,ρF )
< 0
only if δF is close enough to δF,∗.
3.2.3 Zero Value of Distorted Information
We highlight another implication of Theorem 1: if the followers’ policies are indepen-
dent of real-time information, then the communication of distorted information between
followers has no impact on the leader’s performance. For example, if adversaries are com-
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mitted to taking certain actions regardless of the real-time information received, then
there is no value to the leader in distorting the information passing between the follow-
ers, regardless of the leader’s policy δL. This reinforces the idea that policies and the
value of distorted information need to be considered and analyzed together. Proposition
3 captures this conjecture.
Proposition 3. Assume δF1(ζF1) = aF1 and δF2(ζF2) = aF2 for all ζF1 and ζF2. Then
αk,0 = 0, α0,l = 0, αk,l = 0 for k, l ≥ 1 and vL(ζL, yL) = ∑ζF yL(ζF )α0,0(ζL, ζF ).
Hence, the value of distorted information is zero for any finite-memory leader policy
δL ∈ ΠL and reward structure r = (rL, rF1 , rF2).
3.3 Other Cases for the Leader’s Value Function
For large 1, 2, (i) the infinite series may not converge, especially for a large discount
factor β, or (ii) the linear approximation may not be a good approximation of gL. The
value of distorted information may also depend on the signs of higher order αk,ls that
may not be easy to analyze. Thus, we present another result guaranteeing that more
(less) accurate information sharing between two allies (adversaries) will improve the
leader’s value function.
Theorem 3. Assume:
(i) there is a stochastic matrix Ri such that QiRi = Q′i;
(ii) vFiδ,Q(ζ
Fi(t, τ), yFi(t)) is concave in yFi(t) for ζFi(t, τ);
(iii) ζk(0) = {ζk(0, τ), yk(0)}, k ∈ {L,F1, F2} and P (ζL,Fj (0)|ζFi(0)) = 1, i 6= j, i, j ∈
{1, 2}.
Then, vFiδ,Q′(ζ
Fi(t, τ), yFi(t)) ≤ vFiδ,Q(ζFi(t, τ), yFi(t)), i ∈ {1, 2}, hence vLδ,Q′(ζL(0)) ≤
vLδ,Q(ζ
L(0)) for rL = rF1 = rF2 and vLδ,Q′(ζ
L(0)) ≥ vLδ,Q(ζL(0)) for −rL = rF1 = rF2.
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We remark that Qi is considered at least as informative as Q′i (see White and Harrington
1980, Zhang 2010). Theorem 3 implies that for a zero-sum game (a totally cooperative
game), if (i) initially each follower has complete visibility of the other two agents’ states
and (ii) follower i’s value function is concave, then intuition regarding distorted infor-
mation is still valid. Note that the concavity property is not required for vL in Theorem
3 and vFiδ,Q is concave if follower i uses an optimal response policy.
4 Discussion
The analysis in the previous section shows that the intuitive understanding of distorted
information could be invalid and the value of distorted information depends on the re-
ward structure and the policies employed by all agents. Figure 5 illustrates why the
prevalent intuition may fail. Specifically, the value of distorted information is negative
for the totally collaborative case and it is positive for the zero-sum case. Thus the sign
of the value of distorted information will change as the game transitions from totally col-
laborative to zero-sum. However, the sign will not flip abruptly. During the transition,
there are games whose value of distorted information is not positive (and not negative
either) and the value of distorted information is negative (positive) for only a subset
of collaborative (non-collaborative) games “close” enough to the totally collaborative
(zero-sum) case (Theorem 2). Similarly, manipulating distorted information can lead to
a desired outcome only when the policies employed by agents are “good” enough (see
Figure 4). These results suggest that decision makers (e.g., defense planners) should
understand both the objective and the current policy (or practice) of each agent before
modulating information, in order to obtain the desired benefit from intervention.
We remark that even if distorting (enhancing the accuracy of) information passing be-
tween adversaries (allies) can improve the leader’s performance under the current re-
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Figure 5: The value of distorted information (VODI) is negative (positive) for only a sub-
set of collaborative (non-collaborative) games identified by Proposition 2 and Theorem
2.
ward structure and policies in use, this does not imply that the more investment in
distorted information the better. There is a threshold on investment, c1, c2 determined
in Proposition 1, beyond which intelligent followers (especially adversaries) may adjust
their policies, leading to potentially unexpected degradation in the leader’s performance.
These insights are critical for making efficient targeted investments.
4.1 When α1,0 ≤ (≥)α0,1
We remark that α0,1, α1,0 can be viewed as the marginal value to the leader of per unit
distorted information (represented by 1, 2), assuming α
0,0 + α1,01 + α
0,12 is a good
approximation of gL. Below, we demonstrate that the marginal value of per unit dis-
torted information is bounded by
2βMLδ
(1−β)2 , where M
L
δ = maxζ |RLδ (ζ)|. We also present
a set of conditions that guarantee α1,0 ≤ (≥)α0,1. This result can be be useful in iden-
tifying efficient targeted investments. We start with zero memory policies to illustrate
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the concepts without introducing additional and complicated notation. The challenges
in analyzing general finite-memory policies are discussed in the Appendix.
Assume a zero-memory leader policy δL : S → AL and follower i’s zero-memory pol-
icy δFi : SF × SLi × ZFi → AFi , i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Let N = (|S||ZF1 ||ZF2 |), and
assume µ is a one-to-one, onto mapping from {ζ} to {1, 2, ...N}, where ζ = {ζL =
{s}, ζF1 = {sL1 , zF1 , sF }, ζF2 = {zF2 , sL2 , sF }} ≡ {s, zF1 , zF2}. Thus, µ totally orders
{ζ}. A function f : {ζ} → R is isotone in {s, sL2 , sL1 } (with respect to µ) if and only if
µ({s, sL2 , sL1 }) ≤ µ({s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 }) implies f({s, sL2 , sL1 }) ≤ f({s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 }).
Define qδ(k|ζ) =
∑
P (s′|s, δ(ζ)), oF1δ (k|{s, sL2 , sL1 }) =
∑
(
∑
zF1 6=sL2 σsL2 ,zF1P (s
′|s, δ({s, zF1 , sL1 }))),
oF2δ (k|{s, sL2 , sL1 }) =
∑
(
∑
zF2 6=sL1 σsL1 ,zF2P (s
′|s, δ({s, sL2 , zF2}))), where the first sum of
each term is over all s′ such that µ({s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 }) ≥ k.
Theorem 4. ||α0,1|| ≤ 2βMLδ
(1−β)2 and ||α1,0|| ≤
2βMLδ
(1−β)2 . For 0 < β ≤ 1/9, ||αk,l|| ≤
( 8β1−β )
max(k,l)(
MLδ
1−β ), and for 1/9 < β < 1, ||αk,l|| ≤ ( 8β1−β )l+k(
MLδ
1−β ).
Furthermore, α1,0 ≤ α0,1 if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) RLδ ({s, sL2 , sL1 }) is isotone in {s, sL2 , sL1 },
(ii) qδ(k|ζ) is isotone in {s, sL2 , sL1 },
(iii)
∑
sL2 6=zF1 σsL2 ,zF1R
L
δ ({s, zF1 , sL1 }) ≤
∑
sL1 6=zF2 σsL1 ,zF2R
L
δ ({s, sL2 , zF2}), ∀s,
(iv) oF1δ (k|{s, sL2 , sL1 }) ≤ oF2δ (k|{s, sL2 , sL1 }), ∀k, s.
Generally speaking, if distorting information on channel 1 (zF1 6= sL2 ) tends to have
greater impact on the leader’s performance than distorting information on channel 2
(zF2 6= sL1 ), then it is likely that α1,0 ≤ α0,1. The α vectors for an example satisfy-
ing conditions in Theorem 4 are listed in Table 5. The parameters for this example
are included in the Appendix. Theorem 4 in conjunction with Proposition 1 provide
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ζ α0,1 α1,0 ζ α0,1 α1,0 ζ α0,1 α1,0 ζ α0,1 α1,0
[0 0] [0 0] 0 -1.17 -3.85 [0 0] [0 1] 0 -0.62 -3.36 [1 0] [0 0] 0 0.37 -2.55 [1 0] [0 1] 0 0.11 -2.76
[0 1] [0 0] 0 -1.33 -3.97 [0 1] [0 1] 0 -0.68 -3.4 [1 1] [0 0] 0 0.41 -2.44 [1 1] [0 1] 0 1.25 -1.82
[0 0] [1 0] 0 -1.28 -3.93 [0 0] [1 1] 0 1.28 -1.36 [1 0] [1 0] 0 -0.18 -2.94 [1 0] [1 1] 0 0.86 -2.1
[0 1] [1 0] 0 1.09 -1.57 [0 1] [1 1] 0 -0.4 -3.2 [1 1] [1 0] 0 0.53 -2.43 [1 1] [1 1] 0 0.31 -2.49
[0 0] [0 0] 1 -0.92 -3.62 [0 0] [0 1] 1 -0.26 -3.05 [1 0] [0 0] 1 0.89 -2.12 [1 0] [0 1] 1 0.18 -2.73
[0 1] [0 0] 1 -0.98 -3.66 [0 1] [0 1] 1 -0.43 -3.17 [1 1] [0 0] 1 0.31 -2.56 [1 1] [0 1] 1 1.51 -1.58
[0 0] [1 0] 1 -0.87 -3.58 [0 0] [1 1] 1 1.37 -1.66 [1 0] [1 0] 1 0.06 -2.72 [1 0] [1 1] 1 1.36 -1.68
[0 1] [1 0] 1 0.86 -2.18 [0 1] [1 1] 1 -0.04 -2.89 [1 1] [1 0] 1 0.72 -2.24 [1 1] [1 1] 1 0.55 -2.27
Table 5: An example where α1,0 ≤ α0,1
managers with insights for making efficient targeted investments. Assume that the joint
policy (δL, δF1 , δF2) is such that α1,0 ≤ α0,1 ≤ 0, then it is optimal to modulate 1 be-
fore 2 for the higher marginal improvement, while |′1 − 1| ≤ c1. The leader can then
continue to improve its performance by adjusting 2 when |′1 − 1| = c1. Changing 1
beyond this threshold should be approached with caution and be well justified.
5 Conclusions and Future Research Directions
We have examined the value of distorted information in communication in a partially
observable stochastic warfare game with three agents. Intuition suggests that the leader
should benefit from less (more) accurate communication of information between adver-
sarial (cooperative) followers. However, we demonstrated that such intuition is correct
only under certain conditions. We investigated the range of deviations from these con-
ditions under which the intuition remain intact. We further showed that when: (i)
the reward structures are not perfectly aligned enough (or not exactly the opposite),
or (ii) (even good) sub-optimal policies are employed, the communication of distorted
information does not necessarily lead to the expected results. We discussed why the
prevalent intuition may not hold and proposed a holistic paradigm considering both the
reward structures of agents and the policy employed by each agent for an improved
understanding of the value of distorted information. Without adopting such a holistic
paradigm encompassing reward structures, policies, and information accuracy, decision
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makers could easily be led astray by their intuition.
The results of this paper provide meaningful guidance on the effective interventions and
efficient investments. We first identified under what conditions distorting information is
beneficial to the leader (investigating “if and when to invest”). We then obtained insights
that can guide decision makers in making efficient targeted investments. We bound the
marginal improvement on the leader’s performance per unit of distorted information,
which can then be utilized to bound the marginal improvement per investment dollar
(best “bang per buck”) if the relationship between the amount of investment and level
of distorted information is known. We pointed out that more investment may not nec-
essarily improve the leader’s performance; the followers may adjust their policies when
the communication quality is worse enough, which may not be favorable to the leader.
Although we presented our work in the context of warfare, our methodology and results
may be applied to other critical domains such as cybersecurity, business competition,
and political campaigns. For instance, our methodology could help an organization
understand how to influence customers and discredit competitors in order to maximize
margins and market share. Several researchers have identified the power of information
in national politics and diplomatic relations. It has been shown that spreading distorted
information among a party’s supporters may affect the popularity of a party and its
policies, in the context of political contests or campaigns between two parties with
opposing interests (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2012). It would be be interesting to explore
how our formulations and results could be applied to understand the role of information
in these fields. As this research represents an initial investigation into the value of
distorted information in communication to a leader, additional research on the impact of
distorted information on online social networks would also be value adding. Indicatively,
it would be interesting to explore the dependence of the value of distorted information
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on the various structures of communication networks to guide investment decisions.
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Appendix A: Technical Appendices
Proof. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. The proof follows the similar line of reason-
ing as in Chang et al. (2015b) with ci =
bi(1−β)2
4βMFi
, where bi = min{B(µFi) : µFi ∈
ΠFi , µFi 6= δFi} > 0, B(µFi) = vFiQ (δL, δFi , δFj )(ζFi) − vFiQ (δL, µFi , δFj )(ζFi) and MFi =
maxs maxa |rFi(s, a)|, i = 1, 2.
Proof. PROOF OF LEMMA 1. (1) Clearly, a0,0 ≤ 1, a0,l ≤ cl ≤ (4c)l, ak,0 ≤ ck ≤
(4c)k, ∀k, l ≥ 0. Assume ak,l ≤ (4c)l+k for l + k ≤ m, then ak+1,l ≤ c(ak,l + ak+1,l−1) +
2cak,l−1 ≤ (4c)k+l−1(2c)(4c+ 1) ≤ (4c)k+l+1 if c ≥ 1/4. Similarly, ak+1,l ≤ (4c)k+l+1.
(2) W.L.O.G k ≤ l. Initial conditions are clearly satisfied. Assume ak,l ≤ (4c)l for l+k ≤
m. ak+1,l ≤ c(ak,l + ak+1,l−1) + 2cak,l−1 ≤ c((4c)l + (4c)max(k+1,l−1)) + (2c)(4c)max(k,l−1).
If k ≤ l − 2, ak+1,l ≤ (4c)l−1(c(4c + 3)) ≤ (4c)l ≤ (4c)max(k+1,l); if k = l − 1, ak+1,l ≤
(2c)(4c)k(4c+ 1) ≤ (4c)k+1 = (4c)max(k+1,l); if k = l, ak+1,l ≤ (4c)lc(3 + 4c) ≤ (4c)l+1 =
(4c)max(k+1,l) for 0 < c < 1/4. Similarly, ak,l+1 ≤ c((4c)l+1+(4c)l)+(2c)(4c)l ≤ (4c)l+1 =
(4c)max(k,l+1).
Proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 1. Step 1: Represent vL in terms of g.
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Let gLδ be a solution to the equation
gLδ (ζ(t, τ)) = R
L
δ (ζ(t, τ))
+ β
∑
z(t+1)
∑
s(t+1)
P (z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1)|s(t), δ(ζ(t, τ)))gLδ (ζ¯(z(t+ 1), s(t+ 1), δ(ζ(t, τ)), ζ(t, τ))),
where RLδ (ζ(t, τ)) =
∑
a(t) r
L(s(t), a(t))P (a(t)|ζ(t, τ)). Then Proposition 2 in Chang et
al. (2015a) and the fact that each agent uses a finite-memory policy show that gLδ is
unique and vLδ (ζ
L(t, τ), yL(t)) =
∑
ζF (t,τ) P (ζ
F (t, τ)|ζL(t))gkδ (ζ(t, τ)).
Step 2: Represent g in terms of α.
Let gL0 = 0 and g
L
n+1(ζ) = R
L
δ (ζ) + β
∑
z′
∑
s′ P (z
′, s′|ζ, δ)gLn (ζ¯(z′, s′, ζ, δ(ζ)), then
limn→∞ ||gLn − gL|| = 0. It follows from the definition of Q1 and Q2 that
gLn+1(ζ) = R
L
δ (ζ) + Λn(ζ) + 1∆n(ζ) + 2∆¯n(ζ) + 12Θn(ζ)
where:
Λn(ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))gLn (ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
∆n(ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
[ ∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1g
L
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])− gLn (ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
]
∆¯n(ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
[ ∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2g
L
n (ζ¯[s
′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])− gLn (ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
]
Θn(ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
[ ∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1σsL′1 ,z
F ′2g
L
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , zF
′
2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
−
∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1g
L
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])−
∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2g
L
n (ζ¯[s
′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
+ gLn (ζ¯[s
′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
]
.
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Then it is straightforward to show that gLn (ζ) =
∑n−1
k=0
∑n−1
l=0 
k
1
l
2α
k,l
n (ζ), where:
α0,0n+1 = R
L
δ + Λ
0,0
n , α
0,l
n+1 = ∆¯
0,l−1
n + Λ
0,l
n , α
k,0
n+1 = ∆
k−1,0
n + Λ
k,0
n , k, l = 1, ..., n− 1;
α0,nn+1 = ∆¯
0,n−1
n , α
n,0
n+1 = ∆
n−1,0
n ;
αk,nn+1 = ∆¯
k,n−1
n + Θ
k−1,n−1
n , α
n,l
n+1 = ∆
n−1,l
n + Θ
n−1,l−1
n , k, l = 1, ..., n− 1;
αk,ln+1 = ∆
k−1,l
n + ∆¯
k,l−1
n + Θ
k−1,l−1
n + Λ
k,l
n , k, l = 1, ..., n− 1;
αn,nn+1 = Θ
n−1,n−1
n .
and
Λk,ln (ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))αk,ln (ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)]);
∆k,ln (ζ) = −Λk,ln (ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
k,l
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)]), k, l ≥ 0;
∆¯k,ln (ζ) = −Λk,ln (ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l
n (ζ¯[s
′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)]), k, l ≥ 0;
Θk,ln (ζ) = Λ
k,l
n (ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
[ ∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
∑
zF
′
2 6=sL′1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1σsL′1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , zF
′
2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
−
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
k,l
n (ζ¯[s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])−
∑
zF
′
2 6=sL′1
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l
n (ζ¯[s
′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
]
, k, l ≥ 1.
Assuming limn→∞
∑n−1
k=0
∑n−1
l=0 
k
1
l
2α
k,l
n (ζ) exists (the absolute convergence is proved in
step 3), taking the limit gives:
α0,0 = RLδ + Λ
0,0, α0,l = ∆¯0,l−1 + Λ0,l, αk,0 = ∆k−1,0 + Λk,0,
αk,l = ∆k−1,l + ∆¯k,l−1 + Θk−1,l−1 + Λk,l, k, l = 1, ..., n− 1.
and
Λk,l(ζ) = β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))αk,l(ζ¯[s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)]), k, l ≥ 0;
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∆k,l(ζ) = −Λk,l(ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
k,l(ζ¯[s′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)]), k, l ≥ 0;
∆¯k,l(ζ) = −Λk,l(ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l(ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)]), k, l ≥ 0;
Θk,l(ζ) = Λk,l(ζ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))
[ ∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
∑
zF
′
2 6=sL′1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1σsL′1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l(ζ¯[s′, zF
′
1 , zF
′
2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
−
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
k,l(ζ¯[s′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)])−
∑
zF
′
2 6=sL′1
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2α
k,l(ζ¯[s′, sL
′
2 , z
F ′2 , ζ, δ(ζ)])
]
, k, l ≥ 1.
Step 3: Convergence.
Define MLδ = maxζ |RLδ (ζ)| and let ||u|| = maxζ |u(ζ)| for a vector u. We note that
||α0,0|| ≤ MLδ1−β , ||∆k,l|| ≤ 2β||αk,l||, ||∆¯k,l|| ≤ 2β||αk,l||, ||α0,l|| ≤ β||α0,l||+ ||∆¯0,l−1||, and
||αk,0|| ≤ β||αk,0||+ ||∆k−1,0||. Hence, ||α0,l|| ≤ ( 2β1−β )l(
MLδ
1−β ) and ||αk,0|| ≤ ( 2β1−β )k(
MLδ
1−β ).
Furthermore, ||Θk,l|| ≤ 4β||αk,l|| and ||αk,l|| ≤ β||αk,l||+||∆k−1,l||+||∆¯k,l−1||+||Θk−1,l−1||
imply ||αk,l|| ≤ 2β1−β (||αk−1,l||+||αk,l−1||)+ 4β1−β ||αk−1,l−1||. Thus, ||αk,l|| ≤ ( 8β1−β )l+k(
MLδ
1−β )
for 1/9 ≤ β < 1 and ||αk,l|| ≤ ( 8β1−β )max(k,l)(
MLδ
1−β ) for 0 < β ≤ 1/9 by Lemma 1. For
1/9 ≤ β < 1, ||∑∞k=0∑∞l=0 k1l2αk,l|| ≤ MLδ1−β∑∞k=0∑∞l=0 k1l2( 8β1−β )l+k <∞ if 0 < 1, 2 <
1−β
8β ; for 0 < β < 1/9, ||
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=0 
k
1
l
2α
k,l|| ≤ MLδ1−β
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=0 
k
1
l
2(
8β
1−β )
max{k,l} ≤
MLδ
1−β
∑∞
k=0
∑∞
l=0 
k
1
l
2 <∞ for ∀0 < 1, 2 < 1.
Proof. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. Let {vFn } and {δF∗n } be such that
vFn+1(s) = max
aF
{
RF (s, δL(s), aF ) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δL(s), aF )vFn (s′)
}
where vF0 = 0. Then, limn→∞ ||vF∗ − vFn || = 0. If rL = rF , it follows by induction and
the definition of α0,0 that α0,0n+1(ζ¯[s, ζ
L, δL(ζL)], ζ¯[s, ζF1 , δF1∗(ζF1)], ζ¯[s, ζF2 , δF2∗(ζF2)]) =
RF (s, δL(s), δF∗n (s)) + β
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, δL(s), δF∗n (s))vFn (s′) = vFn+1(s). Hence,
α0,0(ζ¯[s, ζL, δL(ζL)], ζ¯[s, ζF1 , δF1∗(ζF1)], ζ¯[s, ζF2 , δF2∗(ζF2)]) = vF∗(s).
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Now if zFi 6= sLj , α0,0(ζ¯[s, ζL, δL(ζL)], ζ¯[zFi , sF , sLj , ζFi , δFi∗(ζFi)], ζ¯[s, ζFj , δFj∗(ζFj )]) =
RF (s, δL(s), δFi∗({zFi , sF , sLj }), δFj∗(s))+β
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, δL(s), δFi∗({zFi , sF , sLj }), δFj∗(s))vF∗(s′) ≤
RF (s, δL(s), δFi∗(s), δFj∗(s))+β
∑
s′ P (s
′|s, δL(s), δFi∗(s), δFj∗(s))vF∗(s′) = vF∗(s). Hence,
∆0,0 ≤ 0, ∆¯0,0 ≤ 0 and α1,0 ≤ 0, α0,1 ≤ 0 from the definition of α1,0, α1,0,∆0,0, ∆¯0,0 in
terms of α0,0, and vLQ′(ζ
L, yL) ≤ vLQ(ζL, yL) from Theorem 1. The proof for the case
where rL = −rF is similar.
Proof. PROOF OF LEMMA 2. (a) Clearly, d(δ, δ′) ≤ 2. Let U ′ = {u : u ∈ U, u(ζ¯(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ))) =
u(ζ¯(s, sL2 , s
L
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ))), ∀ζ,∀δ, δ′ ∈ Π}. Thus, U ′ ⊂ U .
d(δ, δ′)
≥ sup
||u||≤1,u∈U ′
||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||
= sup
||u||≤1,u∈U ′
||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
= sup
||u||≤1,u∈U ′
||
∑
s′
[P (s′|s, δ(ζ))− P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))]u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
= ||P (δ)− P (δ′)||.
(b) U is the set of all bounded, real-valued functions generated by all possible zero mem-
ory policy tuples. Hence, ∀u ∈ U, u(ζ(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ, δ(ζ))) = u(ζ(s, sL2 , sL1 , ζ ′, δ′(ζ ′))),∀ζ 6=
ζ ′, δ 6= δ′. The result follows from the proof in (a).
Lemma 3.
(a) ||∑s′ P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL′1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−∑s′ P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL′1 , ζ, δ′(ζ)))|| ≤
d(δ, δ′)||u||,
(b) ||∑s′ P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL′1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−∑s′ P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL′1 , ζ, δ′(ζ)))|| ≤
d(δ, δ′)||u||+ ||u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))− w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||.
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Proof. PROOF OF LEMMA 3. (a) is from the definitions of d(δ, δ′) and P is a linear
operator.
(b)
||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||
= ||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))
+
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ′(ζ))w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||
≤ d(δ, δ′)||u||+ ||u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))− w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
′(ζ)))||.
Proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 2. Let
u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, ρ(ζ))) =
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ∗ (ζ¯(s
′, zF ′1 , sL′1 , ζ, ρ(ζ)))−α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, ρ(ζ))),
and
w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, ρ(ζ))) =
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ (ζ¯(s
′, zF ′1 , sL′1 , ζ, ρ(ζ)))−α0,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, ρ(ζ))).
||∆0,0δ −∆0,0δ∗ ||
= β||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))[
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ (ζ¯(s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))]
−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ∗(ζ))[
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ∗ (ζ¯(s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))− α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))]||
= β||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ∗(ζ))u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))w(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
≤ βd(δ, δ∗)||u(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))||+ β
(
||α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
)
+ β
|| ∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ∗ (ζ¯(s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))−
∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0
δ (ζ¯(s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||

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where the last inequality comes from Lemma 3.
||α1,0δ − α1,0δ∗ || ≤ ||∆0,0δ −∆0,0δ∗ ||
+ β||
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ∗(ζ))α1,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ
∗(ζ)))−
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ(ζ))α1,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
≤ ||∆0,0δ −∆0,0δ∗ ||+ β
(
d(δ, δ∗)||α1,0δ∗ ||+ ||α1,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α1,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
)
≤ ||∆0,0δ −∆0,0δ∗ ||+ β
(
d(δ, δ∗)||α1,0δ∗ ||+ ||α1,0δ − α1,0δ∗ ||
)
.
||α1,0δ − α1,0δ∗ || ≤
1
1− β ||∆
0,0
δ −∆0,0δ∗ ||+
β
1− β
(
d(δ, δ∗)||α1,0δ∗ ||
)
≤ β
1− βd(δ, δ
∗)η1 +
β
1− β
(
||α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))||
)
+
β
1− β
|| ∑
zF
′
1 6=sL′2
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1
[
α0,0δ∗ (ζ¯(s
′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))− α0,0δ (ζ¯(s′, zF
′
1 , sL
′
1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))
]
||

The result follows by the fact that if ||α1,0δ − α1,0δ∗ || < h1, then α1,0δ < 0. The proof for
α0,1 is similar.
Proof. PROOF OF COROLLARY 1. Under zero-memory policies,
||α1,0δ − α1,0δ∗ ||
≤ β
1− βd(δ, δ
∗)η1 +
β
1− β
|| ∑
zF1 6=sL2
σsL2 ,zF1
[
α0,0δ∗ ({s, zF1 , sL1 })− α0,0δ ({s, zF1 , sL1 })
]
||+ ||α0,0δ∗ − α0,0δ ||

≤ β
1− βd(δ, δ
∗)η1 +
2β
1− β ||α
0,0
δ∗ − α0,0δ ||.
By Lemma 2(b), we have α1,0 ≤ 0 if η1||P (δ) − P (δ∗)|| + 2||α0,0δ∗ − α0,0δ || ≤ 1−ββ h1. The
proof for α0,1 is similar.
Proof. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. Let aF = a∗,∀ζF and define an operator H on
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vector v
[Hv](ζL) = RL(ζL, δL(ζL), a∗) + β
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δL(ζL), a∗)v(ζ¯[s′, ζL, δL(ζL)])
Define the sequence {α˜0,0n } as α˜0,0n+1 = Hα˜0,0n , where α˜0,00 = 0. Thus, α˜0,0 = limn→∞ α˜0,0n
exists, and α˜0,0(ζL) = [Hα˜0,0](ζL). Assume α0,0n (ζL, ζF ) = α˜
0,0
n (ζL), ∀ζL, ∀ζF , then from
the definition of α0,0n+1(ζ
L, ζF ) in the proof of Theorem 1 and by induction, α0,0(ζL, ζF ) =
limn→∞ α
0,0
n (ζL, ζF ) = α˜0,0(ζL), ∀ζL, ∀ζF . Hence, ∆0,0 = 0 and ∆¯0,0 = 0 by the
definitions of ∆0,0 and ∆¯0,0. Accordingly, α0,1 = α1,0 = 0, ∆0,1 = ∆¯1,0 = 0, and
Θ0,0 = 0, which further imply α1,1 = 0. Now assume αk,0 = α0,l = 0, ∀k, l = m, then
∆k,0 = 0, ∆¯0,l = 0 and as a result αk+1,0 = α0,l+1 = 0. Assume ∀k + l ≤ m,αk,l = 0,
then ∆k,l = ∆¯k+1,l−1 = 0,Θk,l−1 = Θk−1,l = 0. Hence, αk+1,l = ∆k,l + ∆¯k+1,l−1 +
Θk,l−1 + Λk+1,l = Λk+1,l. Thus, αk+1,l = 0. Similarly, αk,l+1 = 0. Hence, vL(ζL, yL) =∑
ζF y
L(ζF )α0,0(ζL, ζF ) and the leader’s value function is independent of 1 and 2.
Proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 3. It is easy to show that
vFiδ (ζ
Fi , yFi) =
∑
ζFj ,ζL
RFiδ (ζ)y(ζ
Fj , ζL) + β
∑
z
′
∑
s′
∑
ζFj
∑
ζL
P (z′, s′|s, δ(ζ))y(ζFj , ζL)
× vFiδ (ζ¯(zF
′
i , sL
′
i , s
F ′ , δFi(ζFi), ζFi), λ(zF
′
i , s
L′
i , s
F ′ , δFi(ζFi), ζFi , yFi)),
where λ(zF
′
i , s
L′
i , s
F ′ , δFi(ζFi), ζFi , yFi) is the stochastic array with scalar element
P (ζF
′
j , ζL
′ |zF ′i , sL′i , sF
′
, δFi(ζFi), ζFi) =
P (zF
′
i ,sF
′
,sL
′
i ,ζ
F ′j ,ζL
′ |ζFi ,yFi )∑
z
F ′
j
∑
sL
′
j
∑
ζL
∑
ζ
Fj
P (z′,s′|s,δ(ζ))y(ζFj ,ζL) ,
assuming
∑
z
F ′
j
∑
sL
′
j
∑
ζL
∑
ζFj
P (z′, s′|s, δ(ζ))y(ζFj , ζL) 6= 0.
Thus vFiδ,Q′(ζ
Fi(t, τ), yFi(t)) ≤ vFiδ,Q(ζFi(t, τ), yFi(t)) follows directly from White and Har-
rington (1980). P (ζL,Fj (0)|ζFi(0)) = 1 implies vFiδ,Q(ζFi(0)) = gFiQ (ζ(0)). The results
follow the fact that gLQ = g
F1
Q = g
F2
Q for r
L = rF1 = rF2 and −gLQ = gF1Q = gF2Q for
−rL = rF1 = rF2 .
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Proof. PROOF OF THEOREM 4. The bounds on αk,l can be found in Proof of The-
orem 1. Conditions (i) − (ii) and Lemma 4.7.2 in Puterman (1994) guarantee that
α0,0({s, sL2 , sL1 }) is isotone in ({s, sL2 , sL1 }). Hence,
∑
sL2 6=zF1
σsL2 ,zF1
α0,0({s, zF1 , sL1 })
=
∑
sL2 6=zF1
σsL2 ,zF1
RLδ ({s, zF1 , sL1 }) + β
∑
sL2 6=zF1
σsL2 ,zF1
∑
s′
P (s′|s, δ({s, zF1 , sL1 }))α0,0({s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 })
=
∑
sL2 6=zF1
σsL2 ,zF1
RLδ ({s, zF1 , sL1 }) + β
∑
s′
[
∑
sL2 6=zF1
σsL2 ,zF1
P (s′|s, δ({s, zF1 , sL1 }))]α0,0({s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 })
≤
∑
sL1 6=zF2
σsL1 ,zF2
RLδ ({s, sL1 , zF2}) + β
∑
s′
[
∑
sL1 6=zF2
σsL1 ,zF2
P (s′|s, δ({s, sL2 , zF2}))]α0,0({s′, sL
′
2 , s
L′
1 })
=
∑
sL1 6=zF2
σsL1 ,zF2
α0,0({s, sL2 , zF2})
where inequality comes from Conditions (iii)-(iv), the isotonicity of α0,0 in ({s, sL2 , sL1 }),
and Lemma 4.7.2 in Puterman (1994). Hence, ∆0,0 ≤ ∆¯0,0. The result follows by the
definition of α0,1 and α1,0 in terms of ∆¯0,0 and ∆0,0, respectively.
Challenges in analyzing finite memory policies. Note that by definition, both
α1,0 and α0,1 can be represented in terms of α0,0. Hence, if α0,0(ζ¯(s′, zF ′1 , sL′1 , ζ, δ(ζ))) ≤
α0,0(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , zF
′
2 , ζ, δ(ζ))),∀zF ′1 , zF ′2 , then α1,0 ≤ α0,1. Conditions satisfying this in-
equality are indeed not hard to find. However, such conditions would be rather conser-
vative. It would imply that the impact of having errors on follower 1 is always worse than
that of having errors on follower 2, independent of the magnitude of the errors. It is more
meaningful to compare the average performances, w =
∑
sL
′
2 6=zF
′
1
σ
sL
′
2 ,z
F ′1α
0,0(ζ¯(s′, zF ′1 , sL′1 , ζ, δ(ζ)))
and w′ =
∑
sL
′
1 6=zF
′
2
σ
sL
′
1 ,z
F ′2α
0,0(ζ¯(s′, sL′2 , zF
′
2 , ζ, δ(ζ))), as we did in Theorem 4. However,
it is not straightforward for us to find a contraction operator H satisfying Hw = w
without the zero-memory assumption.
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Appendix B: Parameters for the Examples
Example 1 Meaning of each parameter:
State Spaces
Army SL = SL1 × SL2
sL = (sL1 , s
L
2 ) where s
L
i is the intensity
level of army activity in vicinity of
position i
Militants SF
The state of militants is the allocation
of their heavy weapons.
Observation Space Militants ZFi
Group i’s observation of intensity level
of army activity at location j, shared by
militant group j. Thus, ZFi = SLj .
Action Spaces
Army AL Patrol positions and kill militants
Militants AF
Group i will either use heavy weapons
or reallocate their heavy weapons.
Transition Probabilities
Army P (sL
′ |s, a)
The intensity level of army activity at the
next decision epoch depends on the states
and actions of all agents
Militants P (sF
′ |s, a)
The allocation of limited heavy weapons
next round depends on the current state
and actions of all players. It also captures
the agility of the militants (i.e., how fast
they can move critical resources)
Reward Structures
Army rL(s, a)
Area reclaimed and the number of army
troops killed by militants each round
Militants rFi(s, a)
The number of army troops killed each
round, impact of propaganda and symbolic
purposes, etc.
Example 1 value of parameters - under a fixed leader policy:
Game 1: reward structure Game 2: reward structure
rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF )
29 28 21 30 −29 −28 −21 −30
−24 −33 −13 −32 24 33 13 32
−41 −30 −8 −24 41 30 8 24
33 17 38 46 −33 −17 −38 −46
30 −26 46 23 −30 26 −46 −23
35 22 39 28 −35 −22 −39 −28
−46 −8 −5 −22 46 8 5 22
9 −34 38 −3 −9 34 −38 3


29 28 21 30 −26 −10 −24 −2
−24 −33 −13 −32 4 2 24 15
−41 −30 −8 −24 18 32 48 40
33 17 38 46 −6 −49 −36 −16
30 −26 46 23 −16 16 −15 −5
35 22 39 28 −14 −18 −22 −40
−46 −8 −5 −22 40 39 13 31
9 −34 38 −3 −8 49 −44 5

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Transition Probabilities for both Game 1 and Game 2
P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 1F2 ))
0.17 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.16
0.25 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.14 0
0.26 0.11 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.22 0.07 0.06
0 0.05 0.04 0.1 0.06 0.24 0.22 0.29
0.22 0.05 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.02 0.03
0.16 0.16 0.13 0 0.09 0.07 0.2 0.19
0.12 0.15 0.1 0.11 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.07
0.1 0.09 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.12 0.05 0.1


0.33 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.22 0.1 0.01 0
0.22 0.21 0 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.24
0.18 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.1 0.19 0.04
0.19 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.12
0.18 0.03 0.13 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.17
0.03 0.08 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.18
0.01 0.09 0.15 0.25 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.18
0.21 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.2 0.05 0.18

P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 1F2 ))
0.18 0.11 0.16 0 0.11 0.07 0.16 0.21
0.16 0.07 0.28 0.09 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.2
0.14 0.1 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.04 0.13 0.16
0.03 0.26 0.23 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.11
0.15 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.1 0.08
0.08 0.04 0.05 0.2 0.06 0.13 0.22 0.22
0.11 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.08
0.11 0.14 0 0.04 0.36 0.11 0.04 0.2


0.09 0.02 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.17 0.03 0.24
0.03 0.12 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.18
0.07 0.04 0.28 0.04 0.24 0.03 0.05 0.25
0.03 0.2 0.16 0.06 0.31 0.1 0.02 0.12
0.2 0.21 0.09 0.2 0.01 0.08 0.15 0.06
0.27 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.03 0.23 0.02 0.04
0 0.06 0.19 0.05 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.21
0.16 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.2 0.17 0.12

Example 2 Meaning of each parameter:
State Spaces
Army command sL = (sL1 , s
L
2 ) where s
L
i is the location
SL = SL1 × SL2 of combat unit i.
Combat units SF
The state of the combat units is the
distribution of the heavy weapons of the
militants they are facing.
Observation Space Combat units ZFi
Unit i’s observation of the location of
unit j, shared by unit j. Thus, ZFi = SLj .
Action Spaces
Army command AL Support combat units according to a plan.
Combat units AF
Unit i will either fight the militants
opposing it or provide fire support
to unit j.
Transition Probability P (s
′ |s, a)
The state of next decision epoch depends
on the current state and actions of
all agents.
Reward Structures
Army command rL(s, a)
Area reclaimed and the number of army
troops killed by militants each round.
Combat units rFi(s, a) The number of militants killed per round.
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Example 2 parameters - under a fixed leader policy:
Game 1: reward structure Game 2: reward structure
rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF )
21 14 −1 −11 21 14 −1 −11
−13 47 −20 37 −13 47 −20 37
−30 −14 −20 −29 −30 −14 −20 −29
31 25 −18 −31 31 25 −18 −31
−22 −20 −47 −14 −22 −20 −47 −14
48 −42 49 28 48 −42 49 28
49 21 10 22 49 21 10 22
−12 −45 −27 −27 −12 −45 −27 −27


21 14 −1 −11 33 49 −25 −48
−13 47 −20 37 −29 50 −20 3
−30 −14 −20 −29 −38 −13 −50 −48
31 25 −18 −31 29 32 −38 −46
−22 −20 −47 −14 −45 −24 −2 −38
48 −42 49 28 23 −33 41 45
49 21 10 22 34 25 26 31
−12 −45 −27 −27 −39 −28 −14 −46

Transition Probabilities for both Game 1 and Game 2
P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 1F2 ))
0 0.06 0.2 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.09 0.08
0.06 0.18 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.2 0.13
0.11 0.2 0.13 0.01 0.2 0.04 0.13 0.18
0.2 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.19 0.1 0.14 0.14
0.3 0.13 0.14 0 0.08 0.21 0.1 0.04
0.12 0.08 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.06 0.03 0.11
0.14 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.05 0.21 0.2 0.19
0.31 0.17 0.13 0.07 0.03 0.22 0.02 0.05


0.14 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.1 0.07 0.2 0.18
0.02 0.29 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.26
0.14 0 0.13 0.18 0.1 0.18 0.07 0.2
0.25 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.19 0.18 0.06 0.2
0.28 0.1 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.1 0.23
0.15 0.07 0.2 0.05 0.2 0.19 0.04 0.1
0.1 0.1 0.11 0.04 0.28 0.13 0.07 0.17
0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.1 0.11

P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 1F2 ))
0.02 0.14 0.27 0.18 0.13 0.03 0 0.23
0.07 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.18 0.18 0.09
0.1 0.17 0.15 0.03 0.2 0.03 0.12 0.2
0.21 0.09 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.02 0.11 0.2
0.07 0.11 0.21 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.09 0.16
0.09 0 0.28 0.27 0.18 0.07 0.08 0.03
0.2 0.18 0.06 0.2 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.28
0.15 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.09


0.11 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.15
0.19 0.03 0.17 0.15 0 0.27 0.09 0.1
0.17 0.03 0.13 0.2 0.17 0.05 0.09 0.16
0.1 0.05 0.21 0.1 0.11 0.21 0.12 0.1
0.05 0.15 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.08 0.18
0.21 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.2 0.07 0.1 0.16
0.07 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.14
0.15 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.17 0.09 0.17 0.17

Example 3:
reward structure rk(sL1 , s
L
2 , s
F , aL = fixed, aF1 , aF2 ), k ∈ {L,F1, F2}
rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF )
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
17 48 48 −5 17 48 48 −5
−13 −16 −16 −25 −13 −16 −16 −25
−20 −16 −16 −19 −20 −16 −16 −19
−32 5 5 37 −32 5 5 37
−20 −16 −16 −19 −20 −16 −16 −19
−32 5 5 37 −32 5 5 37
−22 40 40 27 −22 40 40 27
11 −28 −28 47 11 −28 −28 47

Transition Probabilities
P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 1F2 ))
0.06 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.2
0.17 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.07 0.05 0.05
0.31 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.15
0.13 0.15 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.11
0.31 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.15
0.13 0.15 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.2 0.07 0.11
0.33 0.04 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.27 0.02
0.19 0.15 0.12 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.21 0.05


0.2 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.3
0.25 0.1 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.16
0.07 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.08
0.31 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.28
0.07 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.08
0.31 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.28
0.24 0.18 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.04
0.18 0.02 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.19 0.18 0.04

P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 1F2 ))
0.2 0.18 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.24 0.3
0.25 0.1 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15 0.11 0.16
0.07 0.13 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.08
0.31 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.28
0.07 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.13 0.08
0.31 0.12 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.28
0.24 0.18 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.04
0.18 0.02 0.1 0.19 0.1 0.19 0.18 0.04


0.06 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.18 0.31
0.01 0.38 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.17
0.19 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.18
0.02 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.21
0.19 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.06 0.05 0.18
0.02 0.25 0.22 0.01 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.21
0.1 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.13
0.04 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14

Example 4:
reward structure rk(sL1 , s
L
2 , s
F , aL = fixed, aF1 , aF2 ), k ∈ {L,F1, F2}
rL = (s, aL = fixed, aF ) | rF = (s, aL = fixed, aF )
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
−1028 −968 −968 −968 −1028 −968 −968 −968
−962 −1006 −1006 −952 −962 −1006 −1006 −952
−964 −1038 −1038 −1029 −964 −1038 −1038 −1029
−958 −967 −967 −987 −958 −967 −967 −987
−964 −1038 −1038 −1029 −964 −1038 −1038 −1029
−958 −967 −967 −987 −958 −967 −967 −987
1025 1004 1004 998 1025 1004 1004 998
965 1009 1009 1036 965 1009 1009 1036

Transition Probabilities
P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 0F1 , 1F2 ))
0.11 0.03 0 0.17 0 0.17 0.18 0.34
0.08 0.2 0.05 0 0.05 0 0.08 0.54
0.12 0.15 0.12 0 0.12 0 0.36 0.13
0.18 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.4
0.12 0.15 0.12 0 0.12 0 0.36 0.13
0.18 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.17 0.4
0.16 0.09 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.59 0.1
0.1 0.12 0.02 0.1 0.02 0.1 0.42 0.12


0.09 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.35 0.26
0.11 0.15 0 0.05 0 0.05 0.15 0.49
0.07 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.47
0.03 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.27
0.07 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.47
0.03 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.27
0.05 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.24
0.12 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.46 0.1

P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 0F2 )) P (s′|s, a = (0L, 1F1 , 1F2 ))
0.09 0.1 0.01 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.35 0.26
0.11 0.15 0 0.05 0 0.05 0.15 0.49
0.07 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.47
0.03 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.27
0.07 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.1 0.14 0.47
0.03 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.34 0.27
0.05 0.16 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.25 0.24
0.12 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.46 0.1


0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.54 0.01
0.08 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.35 0.26
0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.35
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.37 0.23
0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.23 0.35
0.06 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.37 0.23
0.02 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.35 0.3
0 0.02 0.07 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.1 0.5

Example in table 5:
Reward Structure
ζ rδ(ζ) ζ rδ(ζ) ζ rδ(ζ) ζ rδ(ζ)
[0 0] [0 0] 0 10 [0 0] [0 1] 0 26 [1 0] [0 0] 0 48 [1 0] [0 1] 0 65
[0 1] [0 0] 0 6 [0 1] [0 1] 0 30 [1 1] [0 0] 0 45 [1 1] [0 1] 0 68
[0 0] [1 0] 0 8 [0 0] [1 1] 0 25 [1 0] [1 0] 0 50 [1 0] [1 1] 0 66
[0 1] [1 0] 0 5 [0 1] [1 1] 0 28 [1 1] [1 0] 0 46 [1 1] [1 1] 0 70
[0 0] [0 0] 1 20 [0 0] [0 1] 1 36 [1 0] [0 0] 1 58 [1 0] [0 1] 1 75
[0 1] [0 0] 1 16 [0 1] [0 1] 1 40 [1 1] [0 0] 1 55 [1 1] [0 1] 1 78
[0 0] [1 0] 1 18 [0 0] [1 1] 1 35 [1 0] [1 0] 1 60 [1 0] [1 1] 1 76
[0 1] [1 0] 1 5 [0 1] [1 1] 1 38 [1 1] [1 0] 1 56 [1 1] [1 1] 1 80
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Transition Probabilities Pδ(ζ) = P (s
′|s, δ(ζ))
0.7 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0 0.3 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.2
0.76 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.02 0 0.35 0.1 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.1 0.2
0.74 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.03 0 0.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2
0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.24 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.18 0.2
0.65 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25
0.67 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.39 0.1 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.15 0.1 0.2
0.63 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.45 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.21 0.17 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.25
0.58 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.42 0.1 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.1 0.1 0.2
0.6 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.06 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.3
0.1 0.1 0 0 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.3
0.5 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.3
0.49 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.15 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.1 0.2
0.55 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.35
0.13 0.1 0.02 0.05 0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.22 0.35
0.41 0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.35 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.35

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